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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
judgment action. 0 Perhaps the mixture of the two calls for a reexamination
of the soundness of the rules of federal question jurisdiction; 91 if these
rules are not sound, it is small wonder that confusion is created by the
addition of declaratory procedure. In any event, the problems created by the
clash between the two are deserving of attention and should be clarified by
the courts.
FRANK M. GILLILAND, JR.
ARBITRABILITY UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS
Under many collective bargaining contracts calling for arbitration of
disputes, sooner or later a question has arisen whether the arbitrator has
authority and power to arbitrate a particular issue. While this is obviously
an oversimplification, it is a statement of the problem of arbitrability. 1 In
voluntary arbitration2 of labor disputes the question of the "scope of ar-
bitration" may arise-in either of two situations: (1) in the formulation of
new contracts; or (2) in the disposition of grievances under existing con-
tracts. This Note will consider only arbitration of the latter type.
While "Ninety-odd per cent of all collective bargaining agreements
provide for arbitration as a final step in the grievance procedure . . .",3 there
is little agreement as to how much jurisdiction such provisions give to the
90. The Harvard Law Review suggests,-on precisely the page cited by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in the Skelly Oil opinion, 339 U.S. at 674-after pointing out
the need for congressional classification, that the preferable rule might be "that a
declaratory action seeking to test a defense is triable in the federal courts provided
this defense would normally arise in answer to a complaint which itself would properly
raise a federal question." Such a rule would achieve substantial conformity with
principles applicable to conventional suits, and would make jurisdiction depend on
the nature of the coercive action which the declaratory action has anticipated. De-
velopnents in the Law--Declaratory Judgments, 62 HARV. L. REv. 787, 803 (1949).
91. See Fraser, Some Problems in Federal Question Jurisdiction, 49 MICH. L.
Rav. 73 (1950).
1. Arbitrability is only one aspect of the broader problem of jurisdiction, albeit
the most important aspect-the one most frequently confronting both courts and
arbitrators. This Note will discuss the recent decisions and awards as to the types
of questions held to be within the power and authority of the arbitrator to decide
under collective agreements. For a discussion of the latitude allowed an arbitrator in
reachng his decision-including the "arbitrability of arbitrability," see Scoles, Revicw
of Labor Arbitration Awards on Jurisdictional Grounds, 17 U. oF CHm. L. REV. 616,
623-24 (1950). The two problems are closely related, but the scope of this Note has
been arbitrarily limited so as to cover the specific topic in more detail. Also see U.S.
DEP'T OF LABoR, ARaIRATION OF GRIEVANCES 11 (1946).
2. The Note will not take up compulsory arbitration. For discussion of this problem
see Nurick, Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes Affecting Public Utilities, 54
Dicx. L. REv. 127 (1950) ; Roberts, Compulsory Arbitration of Labor Disputes in
Public Utilities, 1 LA.B. L.J. 694 (1950).
3. Braden, Problems in Labor Arbitration, 13 Mo. L. REv. 143, 167 (1948). See
5 P-H LAB. EQUIPMENT f1 60,017; Nix, Arbitration Provisions in Union Agreements
in 1949, 70 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 160 (1950).
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arbitrator. With the increasing number of decisions on the question of arbi-
trability, a body of precedents is being built up. However, the field of labor
arbitration is so new, relatively, that there has been almost no crystallization
of legal concepts which might be used. 4 Many writers have expressed
views on what is (and should be) arbitrable; but not much authority has
been cited for the different views; and little has been done to rationalize or
reconcile the conflicts.5
The purpose of this Note is to seek a rational basis for the various
decisions regarding arbitrability, in the hope of finding some degree of
predictability. The writers feel that the importance of the subject to labor,
management and society warrants considering not only the contract pro-
visions, but also the types of disputes, in the hope of reaching valid con-
clusions on underlying concepts and principles in the decisions. There is
no necessity for an extended discussion of the status of arbitration in col-
lective bargaining. While the common law rule, accepted by the majority of
the American jurisdictions, is that an agreement to arbitrate future disputes
will not be enforced and is revocable at will by either party,6 this has been
changed by statute in many states.7 By today, "Practically every conceivable
issue that might arise in day-to-day industrial relations has been the subject
of arbitration ... ,"s whether the contract is enforcable or not.
4. Of course, some help may be derived from the field of arbitration generally;
but query whether the probems are sufficiently similar to warrant turning to that
field.
5. "[T]he conflicting court decisions mentioned in this dissent serve to emphasize
the care necessary in preparing labor agreement, and point up the need to establish
some standards to help the parties better understand what the agreement really means."
In re The Lincoln Dairy Co. and Farmers Cooperative, Inc. and International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, 14 L.A. 1055, 1059 (Arb. 1950) ; see Braden, supra note 3, at 145.
6. Note, 43 ILL. L. REv. 678, 679 (1948). The rule had its foundation in commercial
arbitration, but has been extended to labor contracts. The reason for the rule is said
to be that to enforce arbitration would be to oust the courts of jurisdiction and the
parties could bargain away their legal rights and subject themselves and their rights to
extrajudicial bodies. But cf. Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W.
694, 697 (1934). For discussions on the validity of arbitration provisions in labor and
other contracts see Gregory, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and
Scope, 1949 WASH. U.L.Q. 3, 14; Updegraff, Arbitrations and Labor Relations, 1949
WASH. U.L.Q. 54, 57-58; Note, 135 A.L.R. 79 (1941).
7. For detailed analyses of the various state statutes, see ZISKIND, LABoR AaBi-
TRATION UNDER STATE STATUTES (1943); 4 CCH LAB. LAw Rep. 1111 43,505, 43,510
(4th ed.).
8. Davey, Hazards in Labor Arbitration, 1 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 386, 394 (1948).
It is interesting that as early as 1902, Samuel Gompers wrote: "The organized labor
movement in our day is an assertion of the principle that there is no hope that the
workers can protect their interests . . . unless they organize; unless they advocate
conciliation . . . and declare for arbitration with their employers upon any disputed
points upon which they cannot agree." The Limitations of Conciliation and Arbitration,
20 ANNALS 29, 31 (1902). But Gompers also said, "As a rule, men do not care to
refer matters in which they are particularly and financially interested to what are
usually termed disinterested parties." Ibid.
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I. CONTRACTS AND DISPUTES
There are four general arrangements in labor arbitration contract pro-
visions: (1) all disputes subject to arbitration, whether or not under the
contract; (2) all disputes covered by the contract; (3) all disputes except
those specifically exempted; and (4) only those types of disputes specifically
listed.9 Quite obviously the power of the arbitrator is derived from the
contract, in voluntary arbitration. Or to state it another way, the source
of his power must be in the wishes of the parties. The words of the contract
are the formal expression of those wishes. From the language of the de-
cisions, it is clear that the courts and arbitrators seek to find the solutions
to the problem of arbitrability in the words of the contract. But examination
and analysis of a large number of decisions leads to the belief that the word-
ing of the contract is not the most important differentiator of whether the
particular problem is arbitrable. In the first place, it is often most difficult
to categorize the various contract provisions; and even were this task simpler,
once the category is established, it is even more difficult to decide whether
the particular dispute fits the category. It is suggested that attempts to
explain decisions in terms of contract provisions have only added to the
confusion already existing. While the courts and the arbitrators, ostensibly,
fit the dispute into (or out of) the contract terms, more can be accomplished,
in terms of rationalizing, by examining the decisions according to the various
types of disputes than by examining them according to the contract terms.10
As will be shown later, all the difficulties of contract interpretation are
present-and in addition, underlying philosophies, concepts, and policies
make strict adherence to the terms of the contract all but impossible.
(1) The Labor-Management Relationship Generally and Renewal and
Change of Agreements.-In Northland Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Anialga-
mated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees,"
the contract provided for termination of the contract, changes in the contract,
and arbitration of questions relating to hours, wages and working conditions.
The court held that "questions of amendment of a continuing contract are
questions arising under the contract and if they pertain to hours, wages and
working conditions are arbitrable .... -12 On the other hand, it was held
by a court that, "Whether the appellant was bound to employ at its New
Jersey plant members of the respondent union was a debatable question
9. 5 P-H LA-B. EQUIPMENT 60,137. For examples of arbitration clauses see 5
P-H LA. EQUIPMENT 111 64,061, 64,067.
10. There is one exception; where the agreement merely says, "any dispute," "It
doesn't confine the arbitrable questions to those treated by the contract." Defiance But-
ton Co. v. Wholesale and Warehouse Workers Union, 10 L.A. 912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948).
11. 66 F. Supp. 431, 3 L.A. 887 (D. Minn.), appeal dismissed, 157 F.2d 329 (8th
Cir. 1946).
12. 3 L.A. at 890. Cf. Note, 1949 WAsH. U.L.Q. 73, 78.
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which called for a decision as to the scope of the collective bargaining
agreement between the parties. This question, we think, was for the court,
not for the arbitrators."'13 In another case, the contract provided there would
be no strike or lockout. All disputes were to be referred to representatives
for investigation and adjustment. On the alleged violation of the no-strike
clause, the appellate court stayed an action by the company for damages
and ordered arbitration.' 4 Where a contract provided for group insurance,
with the employer required to furnish "such other information as may be
required by the underwriting insurance company . . .," the court granted
a motion to stay arbitration of the question whether the employer must permit
an audit of its books.
15
(2) Discharge, Retirement and Susfiension.-Where a labor agree-
ment provided for arbitration only as to the meaning and application of
the contract, but said nothing about discharges, an arbitrator held that dis-
charges were arbitrable. His grounds were that to hold otherwise would
permit the company to violate the terms of the contract by the device of
discharge. He said that the security of the worker is fundamental to the
labor-management agreement; and to allow unilateral discharges would
make this a nullity.16 And probationary employees were held to be included
in a clause providing for arbitration of discharge of "employees.'17 But
the loss of work by certain employees, because the company closed down
a department and contracted out the work, was held not to be arbitrable
under a contract providing for arbitration of discharges.' 8 In another con-
tract, the employer reserved the sole right to dismiss employees in connection
with changes in operations due to business exigencies. Certain window
trimmers were fired, and nonunion men were hired to do the work. The
court held that the discharges were not arbitrable.' 9 Unless the contract
specifically provides so, there can be no arbitration of disputes over the
13. Belding Heminway Co. v. Wholesale & Warehouse Workers' Union, 295
N.Y. 541, 68 N.E.2d 681, 10 L.A. 899 (1946).
14. Mencher v. B. & S. Abeles & Kahn, 274 App. Div. 585, 84 N.Y.S.2d 718, 11
L.A. 954 (1st Dep't 1948).
15. In re Sohmer and Co., 89 N.Y.S.2d 214, 12 L.A. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
16. Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Workers Union, 13 L.A. 209 (Conn. Sup.
Ct. 1949); It re Standard Oil Co. and Central States Petroleum Union, 14 L.A. 516
(Arb. 1950); In re The Atwater Manufacturing Co. and United Steelworkers of
America, 13 L.A. 747 (Arb. 1949). Contra: Goldberg v. Dowd, 9 L.A. 1027 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1948).
17. It re F.L. Jacobs Co. and United Automobile Workers of America, 11 L.A.
652 (Arb. 1948).
18. It re Berger, 191 Misc. 1043, 78 N.Y.S.2d 528, 9 L.A. 1045 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
Men., 274 App. Div. 788, 81 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1st Dep't 1948).
19. Oppenheim, Collins and Co. v. Display Union, 73 N.Y.S.2d 673, 8 L.A. 1080
(Sup. Ct. 1947) (but under another clause of the contract, arbitration ordered as to
the non-union men who were hired).
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pensioning or retiring of employees.20 On the other hand, suspensions are
generally held to be arbitrable.
21
(3) Wages, Incentives, Overtime and Bonuses.-Although a contract
may provide for reopening of a contract and renegotiation of wages, ar-
bitration will not be ordered without more specific stipulation.22 Even if
arbitration is provided for merit wage increases, this does not include general
wage increases.23 There is disagreement whether the fixing of a rate of
pay for new job classifications is arbitrable under general contract provi-
sions.2 4  Incentive systems have been held subject to arbitration, even
where the wage structure is specifically exempted from arbitration ;25 and
questions of whether overtime rates are to be applied to specific situations
are arbitrable,26 but in the absence of express stipulation, the payment of
a bonus is not arbitrable.
2 7
(4) Vacations, Welfare and Pensions.-The New Hampshire Supreme
Court has held that vacation pay constitutes wages and is arbitrable under
a contract clause calling for arbitration of wage disputes.2 8 But a New Jersey
appellate court ruled that whether certain employees were entitled to vaca-
tions was not arbitrable because the employees did not qualify for the va-
20. American Federation of Grain Millers v. Allied Mills, Inc., 196 Misc. 517,
91 N.Y.S.2d 732, 12 L.A. 485 (Sup. Ct. 1949); General Electric Co. v. United Radio
Workers, 12 L.A. 1081 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949); Grocery Warehousemen v. Kroger Co.,
97 Pitts. L.J. 157, 12 L.A. 334 (Pa. C.P. 1949), aff'd, 13 L.A. 791 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1950).
21. Rogers Diesel & Aircraft Corp. v. U.A.W., 2 L.A. 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945);
Tide Water Oil Co. v. Oil Workers Union, 235 S.W.2d 534, 14 L.A. 81 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950); In re Commercial Pacific Cable Company and American Communications
Association, 11 L.A. 219 (Arb. 1948).
22. Towns & James, Inc., v. Barasch, 197 Misc. 1022, 96 N.Y.S.2d 32, 14 L.A.
293 (Sup. Ct.), af'd inen. 277 App. Div., 857, 98 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1st Dep't 1950); In
re Berger, 191 Misc. 870, 79 N.Y.S.2d 490, 9 L.A. 1048 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd nicn., 274
App. Div. 789, 81 N.Y.S2d 196 (1st Dep't 1948); McCarten v. Brooklyn Bridge
Freezing & Cold Storage Co., 81 N.Y.S.2d 494, 10 L.A. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1948); In re
Ford Instrument Co., 8 L.A. 1064 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947). Contra: United Electrical,
Radio, and Machine Workers of America v. National Pneumatic Co., 134 N.J.L. 349,
48 A.2d 295, 4 L.A. 836 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; In re The Lincoln Dairy Co. and Farmers
Cooperative, Inc. and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 14 L.A. 1055 (Arb. 1950).
23. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America v. Walter Kidde
& Co., Inc., 136 N.J.L. 544, 57 A.2d 54, 14 Lab. Cas. 1 64,335 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
24. Compare In re Continental Carbon Co. and Oil Workers International Union,
12 L.A. 676 (Arb. 1949) with In ri Bliss & Laughlin, Inc. and United Steel Workers
of America, 11 L.A. 858 (Arb. 1948).
25. Sklar Mfg. Co. v. Fay, 11 L.A. 1022 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949); cf. In re Simonds
Worden White Company and International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine
Workers of America, 14 L.A. 365 (Arb. 1950). Contra: Gould Storage Battery Corp.
v. United Electrical Workers, 11 L.A. 322 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1948).
26. Store Employees v. Safeway Stores Inc., 79 N.Y.S.2d 493, 9 L.A. 1042 (Sup.
Ct. 1948), aff'd inm., 274 App. Div. 779, 81 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1st Dep't 1948) ; accord,
Thomasville Chair Co. v. United Furniture Workers of America, 233 N.C. 46, 62
S.E.2d 535 (1950).
27. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917,
67 N.Y.S.2d 317, 6 L.A. 1031 (1st Dep't), aff'd iem., 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464
(1947).
28. Brampton Woolen Co. v. LQcal Union, 61 A,2d 796, 15 Lab. Cas, 1 64,815,
11 L.A. 487 (N.H. 1948),
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cations, by the terms of the contract. 29 In the absence of specific provisions,
welfare and pension plans are not arbitrable. 30
(5) Scheduling of Work, Hours, Number of Employees, etc.-Where
a contract provided that there must be no discharge except for just cause,
the court held that unemployment resulting from the abandonment of a
department was not a proper subject for arbitration. 31 But arbitrators have
held that the length of rest periods32 and a requirement that workers punch
in early are arbitrable.33 Under a general arbitration clause, a court ruled
that a dispute involving working hours was arbitrable, saying: "If it covers
broadly a given field, the mere failure to foresee every possible contingency
should not be treated as a purposeful exclusion of the unforeseen contin-
gency from the operation of the agreement and its arbitration. . . .,,3 Like-
wise, it was held that a union's refusal to issue "shift hour permits" was
arbitrable.3 5 Although a contract provided that management would retain
the right to the direction and disposition of the working forces, an arbitrator
held that the question of how many workers should be in crews was arbi-
trable;36 and the retiming of jobs has been held to be arbitrable under a
general arbitration clause.37  A question of whether a plant should be
closed when business slackened also was held to be arbitrable.
38
II. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES, STATED AND IMPLICIT
From the foregoing, it can be seen that there is little consistency in
the court (or arbitration) holdings. But there are some general principles
which are helpful in- understanding the decisions. Perhaps, the most im-
portant over-all limitation on the power of the arbitrator in a given situation,
29. Textile Workers Union v. Firestone Plastics Division, 6 N.J. Super. 235, 70
A.2d 880, 14 L.A. 129 (App. Div. 1950).
30. Publisher's Ass'n v. Simons, 196 Misc. 888, 93 N.Y.S2d 782, 13 L.A. 637
(Sup. Ct. 1949); cf. General Electric Co. v. United Electrical Radio & Machine
Workers of America, 300 N.Y. 262, 90 N.E.2d 181, 13 L.A. 899 (1949).
31. B.F. Curry, Inc. v. Reddeck, 194 Misc. 527; 86 N.Y.S.2d 674, 12 L.A. 290
(Sup. Ct. 1949); cf. Carborundum Co. v. Wagner, 198 Misc. 24, 96 N.Y.S.2d 278, 14
L.A. 362 (Sup. Ct., aff'd iner., 277 App. Div. 941, 98 N.Y.S.2d 774 (4th Dep't 1950).
32. It re Western Electric Co. and Communications Workers of America, 14
L.A. 262 (Arb. 1950).
33. It re National Lock Co. and U.A.W., 12 L.A. 221 (Arb. 1949).
34. Store Employees v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 79 N.Y.S.2d 493, 497, 9 L.A. 1042
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd nter., 274 App. Div. 779, 81 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1st Dep't 1948).
35. Association of Master Painters v. Brotherhood of Painters, 64 N.Y.S.2d 405,
3 L.A. 898 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem., 271 App. Div. 868, 66 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1st Dep't
1946).
36. In re Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. and United Steelworkers of America, 12
L.A. 865 (Arb. 1949) (but grievance dismissed on the merits).
37. Colt's Industrial Union v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 137 Conn. 305, 77 A.2d 301, 14
L.A. 45 (1950).
38. It re Selby Shoe Co. and United Shoe Workers of America, 12 L.A.. 616
(Arb. 1949).
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as revealed in decisions, is the concept of "inherent rights of management."8 9
Yet, today, the courts are balancing the "rights of management" against
the "underlying purpose to establish peaceful relations" in industry.
40
A related limitation of the arbitrator is the doctrine that, for reasons
of economic function of the industrial plant, certain prerogatives must be
given to (or retained by) management. It is stated that both labor and
management benefit from a reservation of the "managerial function" to those
in managerial positions. One court followed this concept almost specifically
in reasoning that, since the company was in a highly competitive business,
and ability to compete depends on the ability and skill of management,
"The Union must have recognized this, else it would not have consented to
the section referring to the rights of management . .. being put into the
agreement." 41
Another restriction on the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is "public policy."
Public policy is important in two respects: (1) consideration of whether
disagreement and a work stoppage would be dangerous to the public in-
terest, or whether the courts should adhere more to laissez faire principles
as resulting in greater public gain in the long run; and (2) consideration
of whether allowing an arbitrator to decide a given dispute would be against
the public interest (e.g., a dispute over a closed shop-in the light of the
NLRA). "Where a formulation of public policy exists, the arbitrator can
neither ignore nor by an award nullify that public policy.
'42
"Intent of the parties" is becoming more and more the basis for deci-
sions by the courts. 43 Some courts say they follow the intent of the parties-
but only if the intent is expressed in the contract. 44 On the other hand,
39. Cf. Colt's Industrial Union v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 137 Conn. 305, 77 A.2d 301,
14 L.A. 45 (1950).
40. Store Employees v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 79 N.Y.S.2d 493, 497, 9 L.A. 1042,
1044 (Sup. Ct.), affd nee., 274 App. Div. 779, 81 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1st Dep't 1948);
B.F. Curry, Inc. v. Reddeck, 194 Misc. 527, 86 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676, 12 L.A. 290, 291 (Sup.
Ct. 1949) ; Latter v. Holsum Bread Co., 108 Utah 364, 160 P.2d 421, 424 (1945). But
see In re Bliss & Laughlin, Inc. and United Steel Workers of America, 11 L.A. 858,
861 (Arb. 1948) (fact that management clause did not reserve right to set rates for
new jobs not constitute a withdrawal of such right from management).
41. Carborundum Co. v. Wagner, 198 Misc. 24, 96 N.Y.S.2d 278, 283, 14 L.A.
362 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mcm., 277 App. Div. 941, 98 N.Y.S.2d 774 (4th Dep't 1950) ; Cf.
Cox and Dunlop, Regidation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations
Board, 63 HARv. L. REv. 389, 427 (1950).
42. 16 BROOcLY L. REv. 128, 130 (1950); cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. American
Communications Ass'n, 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949). But cf. Latter v. Holsum
Bread Co., 108 Utah 364, 160 P.2d 421 (1945). See Summers and Samoff, The Labor
Board Looks at Arbitration, 2 LAB. L.J. 329 (1951).
43. American Federation of Grain Millers v. Allied Mills, Inc., 196 Misc. 517, 91
N.Y.S.2d 732, 12 L.A. 485 (Sup. Ct. 1949); In re The Lincoln Dairy Co. and Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, 14 L.A. 1055 (Arb. 1950).
44. Association of Master Painters v. Brotherhood of Painters, 64 N.Y.S.2d 405,
3 L.A. 898 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mere., 271 App. Div. 868, 66 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1st Dep't
1946) ; Towns & James, Inc. v. Barasch, 197 Misc. 1022, 96 N.Y.S.2d 32, 14 L.A. 293
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd iner., 277 App. Div. 858, 98 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1st Dep't 1950).
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an arbitrator held that, if it had been the intent of the parties to exclude
the controversy from arbitration, they could have said so; thus, the con-
troversy was arbitrable.
45
One court held that the words of the contract must be construed in
the light of what the words meant to the parties ;46 and another court held
that the use of the words "arbitrate" or "arbitration" are not necessary
to show that the parties intended the matter to be arbitrable.4 7 In ascer-
taining the intent of the parties, the court will look to the conduct of the
parties, 48 including the negotiations of the parties leading to the contract. 49
Also important are the past practices of the company5" and the custom and
practice in the industry.5
The above principles, in themselves, are not sufficient to afford a clear
understanding of the court decisions. Instead, it is necessary to look back
of the stated principles to more basic concepts-and to other, unstated, prin-
ciples. First, consideration should be given to the nature of collective bar-
gaining and arbitration, with an examination of the "rights" so much talked
of in the cases.
With the industrial revolution, there arose the concept of ownership
of a relationship--i.e., means of production. One of the incidents of such
ownership is the right to determine production policy.52 Recognition of the
philosophy of such rights in a relationship can explain the laws which were
passed to prevent the organization of workers, and the use of injunctions
by the courts to prevent concerted action by workers.
Of course, the conflict between the individual worker and management
was uneven. The workers tried to overcome this disadvantage by furtive,
45. In re Western Electric Co. and Communications Workers of America, 14 L.A.
262, 266 (Arb. 1950).
46. Brampton Woolen Co. v. Local Union, 95 N.H. 255, 61 A.2d 796, 797, 15 Lab.
Gas. IT 64,815, 11 L.A. 487, 488 (1948).
47. Mencher v. B. & S. Abeles & Kahn, 274 App. Div. 585, 84 N.Y.S.2d 718, 721,
11 L.A. 954, 955 (1st Dep't 1948).
48. Grocery Warehousemen v. Kroger Co. 97 Pitts. L.. 157, 12 L.A. 334 (Pa.
C.P. 1949), aff'd 13 L.A. 791 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1950).
49. General Electric Co. v. United Radio Workers, 196 Misc. 143, 91 N.Y.S.2d
724, 12 L.A. 1081 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
50. In re Simonds Worden White Company and International Union of Electrical
Radio & Machine Workers of America, 14 L.A. 365 (Arb. 1950); it re Standard
Oil Co. and Central States Petroleum Union, 14 L.A. 516 (Arb. 1950).
51. Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Workers Union, 13 L.A. 209 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1949). But cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications Ass'n, 299
N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949), 16 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 128, 63 HARv. L. Ray. 347 (no
resort to interpretation where the language of the contract is clear).
52. Another incident of ownership of business was that the owner could protect the
business relationship by any means which did not violate the old tort or new contract
laws. When the individual worker left the relationship, the business was not materially
harmed or even altered. But when the workers organized, their concerted action was
a direct threat to the business relationship itself; thus, such concerted action was a




and sometimes illegal, resort to collective economic pressure, a This col-
lective pressure was only a collection of individual pressures until there
arose a new and more abstract concept, the concept of collective bargaining.
This new concept can be shown by, e.g., the NLRA and the language used
in the Jones and Laugldin case.5
4
Furthermore, we can look at collective bargaining, realistically, only
as a contract between two entities, for the benefit of third persons (the
workers).55 In the new relationship, there are three units: the owner (or
management), the individual worker, and the workers' bargaining agent.q
Some employers have refused to bargain collectively, not only because they
have wanted to avoid the consequences, but also because they have failed to
realize the full significance of the new conceptualistic relationship.
Even where there is bargaining, the concept of inherent rights of man-
agement is a tremendous force. In the National Labor-Management Confer-
ence of 1945, management and labor representatives could not agree on
what was properly subject to arbitration. Management's position was that
the following should be left to management: (1) determination of products
to be manufactured or services to be rendered; (2) location of business and
establishment of new units; (3) layout and process (subject to safety
measures); (4) financial policies and prices; (5) management organization
and selection for promotion to supervisory positions; (6) determination of
job content, size of work force and assignment of work; and (7) determi-
nation of safety and property protection methods, where legal responsibility
of the employer is involved. The management committee members held that
discharge, seniority provisions, 'disciplinary penalties, "and such other
53. "In the early common law, labor organizations were regarded as criminal
conspiracies and any demands made by such groups were regarded as unlawful and
criminal attempts at extortion." UPDEGRAFF AND McCoY, ARBIraTION OF LABOR Dis-
PuTas 19 (1946); cf. Note, 2 VAqN. L. Rnv. 441, 442 (1949).
54. "Employees have as clear a right to organize and select their representatives
for lawful purposes as the respondent has to organize its business and select its own
officers and agents." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1, 33,
57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed.' 893 (1937).
"For human interests will assert themselves continually in new ways and significant
institutions of every-day life often arise extra-legally and produce their most important
results independent of or even against the law. For example, the law of contracts, the
law of master and servant, the law of voluntary associations and the law of public
service have but little relation to the actualities of modern industry, in which the
laborer, or rather the group of laborers, has a vested right in the job not arising out
of contract, which is not lost during a strike, in which the conditions of employment
are not fixed by law nor by the parties to the relation but by union rules, in which
the relation is not individual but collective, in which bargains are made with and en-
forced on behalf of de facto entities that are not legal entities, and in which the obli-
gations of public service do not apply to groups by which the most vital public services
are in fact performed." Pound, The Administrative Application of Legal Standards,
in A.B.A. REP. 445, 453 (1919).
55. Rentschler v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 126 Neb. 493, 253 N.W. 694, 699 (1934).
56. To govern the relationship there must be three contracts, all interrelated:
between the owner and the individual worker, between the owner and the bargaining
agent, anl between the individual worker and the bargaining agent.
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matters as may be mutually agreed upon" are properly subject to review
by grievance procedures. Labor's position was that "It would be extremely
unwise to build a fence around the rights and responsibilities of management
on the one hand and the unions on the other. The experience of many years
shows that with the growth of mutual understanding the responsibilities
of one of the parties today may well become the joint responsibility of both
parties tomorrow." 57 Gompers, long ago, said: "One of the greatest causes
of the disturbance of industry, the severance of friendly relations between
employer and employees, is the fact that the employers assume to themselves
the absolute right to dictate and direct the terms under which workers shall
toil .... 58s However, labor is not alone in this view. Speaking for a large
corporation, one employer said, "If another disagreement, of any nature,
should arise, arbitration is the cure that has been provided. Why not? . ..
Yes, democracy in business is practical." 59
Of course, in the contract between management and labor, management
gives up some of the rights of setting production policy, and the bargaining
agent for the workers gives up the right to strike, ither immediately or
for a given period.60 In other words, "Collective bargaining . . . is the
substitution of bilateral for unilateral decisions in the field of labor-manage-
ment relations." 6' 1 The courts, for better or for worse, are beginning to pay
less heed to "inherent rights" of management, and more to the bilateral
nature of the agreement. Still it must be said that, in those fields about
which management is reluctant to bargain, and about which the NLRA
does not require bargaining, there is a tendency to find that the dispute is
not arbitrable.62 This is, perhaps, the most important thing for framers of
collective agreements to remember.
57. THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL LABOR-MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE OF 1945-Sum-
MARY AND COMMITTEE REPORTS 58-61 (U.S. Dep't of Labor 1946).
"In a survey of 216 companies, the National Industrial Conference Board found ...
that 129 contracts banned arbitration of any issues while others specifically excluded
such matters as: the right to hire, promote and discipline, the right of management to
determine policy, production and operation, discharges and layoffs, planning of pro-
duction schedules, adequacy of hourly and incentive rates, and a variety of other issues."
5 P-H, LAB. EQUIPMENT ff 60,081.
58. Gompers, The Limitations of Conciliation and Arbitration. 20 ANNALS 29, 33
(1902).
59, Nunn, A New Concepf by Capital of Labor's Relationship in Industry, in
A.M.A. PERSONNEL SER. No. 32 (1938); cf. MATHEWS et al., LABOR LAW CASES 84
(Temp. ed. 1950).
60. It is true that, from this contract, the individual worker derives certain
benefits; likewise, the individual worker gives up certain rights; e.g., the right to join
with other workers in a strike. But this should not make us lose sight of the fact that
the contract is between management and the bargaining agent (i.e., that the individual
worker is not a party, to the contract).
61. Gregory, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and Scope, 1949
WASH. U.L.Q. 3; see Frey, The Logic of Collective Bargaining and Arbitration, 12
LAW & CONTEMP. PBOB. 264 (1947).
62. Set out in some detail on p. 852 supra. For a decision that management may insist
on a "management prerogative clause," see American National Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 187
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Another basis for confusion in this field is the dispute as to the nature
of arbitration. 3 Some persons would restrict the jurisdiction of the ar-
bitrator on the ground that arbitration is a judicial process,
0 4 and he should
not be allowed to "legislate" for the parties. This should not be serious
ground for limiting arbitration; any analogy to the political scene must be
differentiated in that there is much less reason for a "separation of
powers." There is little danger that the arbitrator may obtain too much
power, for he may be removed even if he is a permanent arbitrator. Further-
more, subsequent negotiations by the parties may overcome any inadvertent
setting of policy by the arbitrator. It should also be remembered that set-
ting policy in the labor relations field is not legislating in the ordinary
sense, for it is accomplished by two opposing forces. Nevertheless, where
the decisions are important ones to the parties involved, it is argued that
the arbitrator must not go outside the provisions of the contract and estab-
lish policy-that policy making should be left to the parties by direct ne-
gotiations.65 To state it another way, the arbitrator must be restricted to
the "scope of the contract." There can be little disagreement with this
statement; but a problem arises in interpreting the meaning of "scope of the
contract." A phrase so general in its terms can be of little help in under-
standing the bounds of authority of the arbitrator. Unfortunately, language
does not permit a more specific enunciation of those bounds. It seems clear
that there must be some restriction on the authority of the arbitrator; but
the phrase "scope of the contract" apparently has led courts away from
realism in holding that, where the matter in controversy is not specifically
set out in the contract, it is not arbitrable. 6 Though it is impossible to be
more specific in the use of language, interpretation of the phrase should be
much more liberal.
F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1951) ; cf. Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by
the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389 (1950).
63. "[Tlhe major problem in labor arbitration today is, 'What is labor arbitra-
tion?'" Braden, Problems in Labor Arbitration, 13 Mo. L. REV. 143, 147 (1948).
64. See Sanders, Types of Labor Disputes and Approaches to Their Settlement, 12
LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 211, 216 (1947); Braden, Toward Effective Arbitration, in
1950 ARBITRATION CASES INVOLVING FEDERATION OF GLASS, CERAMIC AND SILICA SAND
WORKERS OF AMERICA 73 (Beard ed. 1951). But see Warren and Bernstein, The Ar-
bitration Process, in id. at 91; Carlston, International Arbitration in the Postwar
World, 13 Mo. L. Rv. 133 (1948).
65. Gompers, supra note 58 at 31. But see Garman, How Organized Labor can
Cooperate with Managements, in A.M.A. PERSONNEL SER. No. 44, (1940) (must be
balanced against desire for industrial peace) ; cf. Towns & James, Inc. v. Barasch, 197
Misc. 1022, 96 N.Y.S.2d 32, 35, 14 L.A. 293, 294 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inre. 277 App,
Div. 858, 98 N.Y.S.2d 212 (lst Dep't 1950).
66. Publishers Ass'n v. Simons, 196 Misc. 888, 93 N.Y.S.2d 782, 13 L.A. 637
(Sup. Ct. 1949); United Electrical Radio & Machine Workers of America v. Walter
Kidde & Co., 136 N.J.L. 544, 57 A.2d 54, 14 Lab. Cas. V1 64,335 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
Goldberg v. Dowd, 9 L.A. 1027 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948); Colt's Industrial Union v.
Colt's Mfg. Co., 137 Conn. 305, 77 A.2d 301, 14 L.A. 45 (1950).
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In this connection, the collective agreement is something more than a
mere contract. By one school of thought, it should not attempt to cover
all aspects of the employer-employee relationship. The contract should
be only a rough framework to be filled in by the grievance process and
arbitration, and should be so regarded.67 It would seem that this is nec-
essary in the light of the almost infinite kinds of situations which may arise
in the industrial relationship. If arbitration has any purpose at all, it is to
promote peaceful labor-management relations. And when arbitration is re-
fused on the ground of nonarbitrability, the workers in a plant are apt to
react unfavorably. 8
III. COURTS v. ARBITRATION
Where the labor agreement calls for arbitration of disputes arising
under the contract and for application and interpretation of the contract,
there is some question whether the court is really taking away the function
of the arbitrator in interpreting the contract itself. 9 There is no clear
distinction between the procedural question of arbitrability and the sub-
stantive dispute itself;7° but it has been held that, if the intent to arbitrate
has not been clearly expressed in the contract, "neither party will be de-
prived of the constitutional right to seek redress in the courts .... ,,7
The result of this kind of thinking by the courts results in decisions
like that in General Electric Co. v. United Electric Radio & Machine Work-
ers of America7 2 where the company voluntarily established a pension plan
based on the time for which employees were paid by the company. The
contract was silent as to pensions, but provided that there would be no dis-
67. Gregory, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and Scope, 1949
WASH. U.L.Q. 3, 15-16.
68. "We have one such case, which stands out like a sore thumb .... [T]he arbi-
trator ruled that the case was not arbitrable--even while he went ahead and dealt
with the merits of the case .... this award has cost, and will cost, the Company thou-
sands of units of production through discontent of the workers, who firmly believe they
were cheated." BEARD, Foreword in 1950 ARBITRATION CASES INVOLVING FEDERATION
OF GLASS, CERAMIC AND SILICA SAND WORKERS OF AMERICA V (Beard ed. 1951);
Cf. MATHEWS et al., LABOR LAW CASES 377 (Temp. ed. 1950).
69. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications Ass'n, 299 N.Y.
177, 86 N.E.2d 162, 169 (1949) (dissent), 16 BROOKLYN L. REV. 128, 63 HARv. L.
REv. 347. But cf. In re Berger, 191 Misc. 870, 79 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491, 9 L.A. 1048, 1049
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd iem., 274 App. Div. 789, 81 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1st Dep't 1948) : "The
court is required to determine whether, under a fair and reasonable interpretation of
the agreement, the parties intended that a dispute . . . was to be arbitrated." Also see,
Belding Heminway Co. v. Wholesale & Warehouse Workers Union, 295 N.Y. 541,
68 N.E.2d 681, 10 L.A. 899 (1946).
70. Cf. In re Dictograph Products, Inc. and United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America, 8 L.A. 1033, 1038 (Arb. 1947); Textile Workers Union v.
Firestone Plastics Division, 6 N.J. Super. 235, 70 A.2d 880, 14 L.A. 129 (App. Div.
1950).
71. Association of Master Painters v. Brotherhood of Painters, 64 N.Y.S.2d 405,
409, 3 L.A. 898, 900 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd inem., 271 App. Div. 868, 66 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1st
Dep't 1946).
72. 300 N.Y. 262, 90 N.E.2d 181, 13 L.A. 899 (1949).
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crimination for union activities. The question in the case involved the ar-
bitrability of a refusal by the company to allow pension time credit for time
spent in union activities, beyond the hours for which the company had agreed
to pay. (Note that the company was paying for part of the time spent in
union activities.) The court held that the question was not arbitrable, say-
ing, "There is no possible basis for a charge of discrimination, and by that
token, no possible ground for arbitration. ' 73 It seems that to hold there was
no discrimination must, necessarily, be to decide on the merits. This is
brought out more clearly by the language of the lower court in the same
case: "the parties have agreed by the arbitration clause to reserve to the
arbitrators any question affecting the application or interpretation of the
contract .... there is no question as to the scope of the contract."
74
The problem is also brought out by the dissent in In re International
Association of Machinists: "A claim may be 'so unconscionable . . .' as
to justify the Court in refusing to order the parties to proceed to arbitra-
tion . . . but I do not so regard the claim here asserted. . . . If there is a
possibility of such a construction [of the contract, in favor of the claimant],
the Court should not remove the controversy from the sphere of arbitration.
.". If a court, on reviewing an award, arrives at its own interpretation
of the contract and sets aside the award on the ground that it is a modifi-
cation of the contract, "the court's action seems seriously to impair the
usefulness of arbitration proceedings. '76 These things should be borne in
mind when considering that, for a long time, there has been a trend away
from the courts toward arbitration and conciliation.71
Another question which must be faced, is whether the courts should
act in advance of the arbitrator to decide arbitrability. It is argued that the
question often would be moot for the courts, if the arbitrator were allowed
to decide initially. Also, it is argued that, since the parties voluntarily have
entered into the contract, the arbitrator should be required only to be "rea-
sonable" in reaching his decision on the question of arbitrability-that the
courts should only review his decision as to reasonableness, instead of de-
ciding the question of arbitrability on its merits. As a general rule, the courts
73. 90 N.E.2d at 182, 13 L.A. at 900. Also see In re Berger, 191 Misc. 1043, 78
N.Y.S2d 528, 9 L.A. 1045 (Sup. Ct.), affd mern., 274 App. Div. 788, 81 N.Y.S.2d 195
(lst Dep't 1948).
74. 86 N.Y.S.2d 581, 583, 11 L.A. 1020, 1021 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
75. 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464, 7 L.A. 959 (1947).
76. 63 HARv. L. REv. 347 (1949). See Mosaic Tile Co. and Zanesville Local No.
79, reported in 1950 ARBITRATION CASES INVOLVING FEDERATION OF GLASS, CERAMIC
AND SILICA SAND WORERS oF AMERicA 22 (Beard ed. 1951).
77. Latter v. Holsum Bread Co., 108 Utah 364, 160 P.2d 421, 424 (1945) ; cf. Scoles,
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards on Jurisdictional Grounds, 17 U. OF Cni. L.
Rav. 616, 623 (1950).
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